Institutions and Entrepreneurship: The Role of The Rule of Law by André van Stel et al.


































André van Stel 
David J. Storey 
Zoetermeer, January 2010 
  
 
Institutions and entrepreneurship: 
The role of the rule of law 
 
 









EIM Research Reports 
 
reference number  H201003 
publication  January 2010 
emailaddress corresponding author  ast@eim.nl 
 
address  EIM 
  Bredewater 26 
  P.O. BOX 7001 
  2701 AA  Zoetermeer 
  The Netherlands 
  Phone: +31 79 343 02 00 
  Fax: +31 79 343 02 03 





Dit onderzoek is mede gefinancierd door het programmaonderzoek MKB en On-
dernemerschap (www.ondernemerschap.nl) 
Voor alle informatie over MKB en Ondernemerschap: www.ondernemerschap.nl 
De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud berust bij EIM bv. Het gebruik van cijfers 
en/of teksten als toelichting of ondersteuning in artikelen, scripties en boeken is 
toegestaan  mits  de  bron  duidelijk  wordt  vermeld.  Vermenigvuldigen  en/of 
openbaarmaking  in  welke  vorm  ook,  alsmede  opslag  in  een  retrieval  system,  is 
uitsluitend toegestaan na schriftelijke toestemming van EIM bv. EIM bv aanvaardt 
geen aansprakelijkheid voor drukfouten en/of andere onvolkomenheden.  
 
The  responsibility  for  the  contents  of  this  report  lies  with  EIM  bv.  Quoting 
numbers or text in papers, essays and books is permitted only when the source is 
clearly mentioned. No part of this publication may be kopied and/or published in 
any form or by any means, or stored in a retrieval system, without the prior written 
permission of EIM bv. EIM bv does not accept responsibility for printing errors 
and/or other imperfections.    3 
INSTITUTIONS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: 




EIM Business and Policy Research, Zoetermeer, the Netherlands 
 
André van Stel 
EIM Business and Policy Research, Zoetermeer, the Netherlands, and 
Amsterdam Center for Entrepreneurship (ACE), University of Amsterdam, the Nether-
lands 
 
David J. Storey 






This paper examines variations in entrepreneurship across twenty developed coun-
tries, using three measures of entrepreneurship which we broadly describe as pre-
start, early-stage and established enterprises. It then links these measures to the 
economic institutional framework, holding constant a range of other factors. Two 
groups of conclusions emerge. The first is that the factors that influence pre-start, 
early-stage and established enterprises differ often quite sharply. Second, our re-
sults  broadly  confirm  earlier  work  suggesting  that  social  security  entitlements, 
taxes, and employment protection legislation are negatively associated with (dif-
ferent forms of) entrepreneurial activity. However, our novel finding is that coun-
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1. Introduction 
Entrepreneurship, in some form, has long been argued to be an ingredient for eco-
nomic development. So, since governments increasingly see themselves as having 
a responsibility for enhancing the economic welfare of their citizens, virtually all 
developed  countries  now  have  a  suite  of  policies  in  place  that  seek  to  pro-
mote/enhance/facilitate entrepreneurship (OECD, 2008). 
 
In practice however, whilst the need for policies to enhance entrepreneurship is 
recognised,  governments  are  understandably  perplexed  by  the  contradictory  re-
search  evidence  of  the  effectiveness  of  these  policies.  This  means  governments 
have to make choices over spending considerable sums of money,  yet are often 
faced with highly imperfect evidence about policy effectiveness.  
 
The context for this paper is these policy choices. The first policy choice is over 
precisely what constitutes entrepreneurship. Is it having taken some steps towards 
starting a business; is it having actually started a business or is it a measure of 
business  ownership?  Since  these  are  by  no  means  the  same  measures,  the  first 
choice is to decide which best captures the slippery concept of entrepreneurship. 
 
Having made that choice governments then have to decide which policies are most 
likely to enhance their chosen measure of entrepreneurship. A key distinction is 
between micro and macro policies (Storey and Greene, 2010). Micro policies are 
those forms of government support where the specific target audience are SMEs or 
entrepreneurs. Such policies include provision of loans and grants to small firms, 
or the provision of information and advice, or enhancing the information network 
open to small firms. A useful "rule of thumb" is that micro policies are those for-
mulated and delivered primarily by the government department which has explicit 
responsibilities for enterprise and entrepreneurship.  
 
This contrasts with government macro policies which often have a major impact 
upon entrepreneurship and small firms, even though they are not the prime focus of 
policy. Within macro policies a distinction can be drawn between traditional macro 
economic targets such as lowering inflation, increasing GDP, lowering unemploy-
ment, etc., and institutional framework policies. By the latter, we mean primarily 
the legislative framework which influences entrepreneurs such as employment pro-
tection  legislation,  contract  enforcement,  competition  policy  and  even  immigra-
tion. Here it is clear that the prime 'target audience' is not SMEs or entrepreneurs, 
but wider sections of the electorate. Delivering these institutional policies requires 
striking a balance between the interests of citizens, workers and large and small 
enterprises. 
 
This paper begins by contextualising our interest in linking both macro and micro 
policies to promote entrepreneurship and hence economic development. There are 
numerous studies which link individual instruments of micro-policy to enhanced 
entrepreneurship outcomes, but the outcome is a far from consistent picture.  
 
However, our focus in this paper is on macro- or institutions policy and its impact 
upon entrepreneurship. Again the early evidence clearly pointed to policies in this 
area – most notably taxes, regulation and the rule of law having a major influence 
on the scale of entrepreneurship in a country. However more recently these certain-
ties have been questioned and our role is to contribute to that debate.  
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The empirical contribution of this paper is to examine the impact that economic in-
stitutions have upon entrepreneurship. We particularly focus on the role of the rule 
of law. The unique contribution of the paper is to take these institutional concepts 
and ask whether the inconsistent results obtained reflect a lack of clarity in the 
definition of entrepreneurship used, not just in this paper, but more widely by pol-
icy makers. It specifically distinguishes between the role of economic institutions 
in influencing nascent entrepreneurship, young business entrepreneurship and busi-
ness ownership. What is clear is that none of the institutional variables exerts a 
significant consistent influence across all three indicators of entrepreneurship. Of 
the five economic institution measures identified for example, only one has a sig-
nificant influence on nascent entrepreneurship.  
 
A second key contribution of the paper is its finding that countries where the rule 
of law is weak in fact demonstrate greater entrepreneurship, defined as business 
ownership, than where the rule of law is strong. This appears to contradict earlier 
work by Nyström (2008), and it also looks incompatible with the findings of Ard-
agna and Lusardi (2009), who are unambiguous in this matter saying 'all our esti-
mates point to a negative effect of regulation'. 
 
Our results, by contrast, point towards a more nuanced view of the impact of regu-
lation and the rule of law on entrepreneurship, reflecting the earlier interpretation 
of Van Stel et al. (2007) and Capelleras et al. (2008). It is that government policies 
influence the balance of advantages and disadvantages of formal and informal en-
trepreneurship. They also influence the advantages and disadvantages of being a 
large or small firm. Our key result relating to the rule of law, is that it is large, 
rather than small, firms that are the prime beneficiaries. It clearly does not imply 
that small firms do not benefit from a modern and efficient legal system. What it 
does imply is that large firms are able to acquire more of these benefits, so ex-
plaining our findings. 
 
 
2. Theory and Prior Work 
This paper takes as its key assumption that entrepreneurship is a choice and that 
the rationale underpinning that choice is that some individuals will shift from other 
"states" such as paid employment as an employee, unemployment or economic in-
activity into entrepreneurship when they perceive that it becomes more attractive 
to them than their current "state" (Parker, 2004). 
 
Given this choice-based framework we also assume that, because they believe that 
entrepreneurship enhances economic development, governments wish to make this 
option more attractive to individuals. To tilt the balance in favour of entrepreneur-
ship governments can either make entrepreneurship more attractive, or make the 
other "states" less attractive. 
 
The policies available to government can be grouped into micro and macro instru-
ments (Storey and Greene, 2010). Micro policies are those that focus on entrepre-
neurs, potential entrepreneurs and small businesses. These policies are the prime 
responsibility of the department of government responsible for SMEs or enterprise. 
Examples  of  micro-policies  include  loans  and  grants,  information  and  advice, 
management training, awareness raising etc. There is an extensive literature that 
describes these policies, but a more modest literature that carefully assesses their 
impact. At the risk of over-simplification, the view that emerges from the assess-  6 
ment literature is one of a mixed picture but where the clearer positive impacts 
seems to be where less sophisticated evaluation methods have been employed.
1  
 
However our purpose here is to focus upon macro, rather than micro, policies. The 
unifying characteristic of such policies, it will be recalled, is that they impact upon 
entrepreneurship without having the entrepreneur as their prime target. Indeed in 
some cases the entrepreneur is hardly even considered when such policies are for-
mulated or discussed. Key examples include policies on the rule of law, on regula-
tion, immigration, competition, taxation, social security entitlement as well as tra-
ditional macro-economic policies to control inflation and aggregate demand. 
 
 
2.1 Four macro policies 
This paper examines four macro policies where the link with entrepreneurship has 
been examined in prior work. These are taxes, regulation, the rule of law and so-
cial security entitlement. We now briefly review prior work on each policy area 
and, on the basis of this set out our expectation of the link between the four policy 
areas and entrepreneurship. Underpinning our expectations are two assumptions. 
The first is that policies can make entrepreneurship more attractive either directly 
or by making other options less attractive (Parker, 2004). So, policies that make 
both  entrepreneurship and  other  options more  attractive  are  likely  to  have  am-
biguous outcomes. Our second assumption is that policies can influence the distri-
bution of entrepreneurship between formal and informal, and productive and un-
productive activities, without necessarily influencing the quantity of entrepreneur-
ship (Baumol, 1990). 
 
•  Taxes 
 
In matters relating to taxation on income, employees and the self-employed differ 
in  three  important  respects.  First,  whilst  employees  have  their  tax  removed  "at 
source" by their employer, the self-employed declare their income to the tax au-
thorities.  Second,  the  employee  pays  their  tax  immediately,  whereas  the  self-
employed pay in arrears, normally at the end of a financial year. Thirdly, the self-
employed are able to claim expenses against their income on a scale not normally 
available to the employee. These three differences offer potential financial benefits 
to the self-employed that are not available to the employee and might therefore in-
fluence an individual's choice in favour of self-employment. 
 
Given that most individuals would choose not to pay taxes, it is expected that low-
ering tax rates for the self-employed or raising taxes on employees leads individu-
als to shift to self-employment. Schuetze (2000) supports this by showing that in-
creases  in  average  income  tax  rates  have  large  and  positive  effects  on  self-
employment in Canada, 1983-94. For Sweden, Fölster (2002) finds that reducing 
the tax burden by 10% (of GDP) would increase the share of the self-employed in 
employment by about 3%.  
 
 
1 For example in the US the Small Business Development Corporations SBDCs are reviewed by Chrisman and Macmullan 
(2004); the SBIR programme is reviewed by Wallsten (2000); in the UK the advice service Shell LiveWire is reviewed 
by Greene and Storey (2007); in Canada the small firm loan guarantee programme is reviewed by Riding and Haines 
(2001) and Riding et al (2007); in Belgium the advisory services are reviewed by Lambrecht and Pirnay (2005); in Japan 
the Science Park programmes is reviewed by Fukugawa (2006).    7 
In contrast, Robson and Wren (1999) and Bruce (2000) draw an important distinc-
tion between changes in the average, and changes in marginal, rates of taxation. 
They find that lowering marginal rates of tax increases effort, since individuals 
"keep" more of the income they generate. Since the self-employed have more op-
portunity to vary their input than employees it means they are prepared to work 
more hours. However, the lowering of average rates reduces the potential gains to 
the self-employed from evasion and so reduces the differential between paid and 
self-employment. It is because of the offsetting influences of these two factors that 
more recent empirical evidence of changes in income taxes upon self-employment 
is more mixed. 
 
Schuetze and Bruce (2004) provide a helpful review of several recent studies on 
this topic. They conclude that the "evidence" of the impact of taxation on self-
employment is now less clear. They conclude: 
 
"The fact that self-employment appears to increase with income tax rates calls 
into question the common view that high taxes hamper self-employment." p. 
259. 
 
The discussion above has focussed exclusively on the impact of income taxes, but 
governments also impose business, sales and inheritance taxes, all three of which 
may influence the behaviour of small businesses and their owners. For example, 
Michaelas et al. (1999) showed that taxes which were levied on small company 
profits were likely to lead to lower growth rates, since the retained profits were the 
prime source of funding for small company investment. 
  
The above suggests that a simple relationship between low rates of taxation and an 
entrepreneurial economy does not exist. Instead, the nature of taxation influences 
the behaviour of individuals both in their choice of employee or self-employment 
status, and in their choices as business owners. It also influences their effort as a 
self-employed person. 
 
•  Regulation 
 
There is now an extensive and authoritative literature linking regulation, in one 
form  or  another,  to  entrepreneurship.  The  pioneering  study  by  Djankov  et  al. 
(2002) pointed to considerable variations between countries in both the time and 
cost of business creation. For example, at that time, it took 82 days to start a busi-
ness in Spain compared with less than three in countries such as Canada, the US 
and New Zealand. It was argued that these regulations, although they may have 
been justified on the grounds of providing protection for customers and creditors, 
had a direct effect on lowering business start-up rates. Second, it was argued that 
employment protection legislation and regulation in the product market served to 
raise the operating costs of a small business and so make entrepreneurship rela-
tively less attractive. Finally it was argued that high regulation also "tilted the bal-
ance" away from small firms and towards large firms since the latter were able to 
more easily respond to, and perhaps even manipulate it in their favour.  
 
The empirical work seemed to point, without ambiguity, to regulation suffocating 
entrepreneurship. Ardagna and Lusardi (2009) reflect that certainty when they say: 
 
  "All our estimates point to a negative effect of regulation"   8 
 
In response to this evidence policy makers then engaged in a competitive game to 
seek to lower regulation, reflected for example in terms of numbers of days to start 
a business. To illustrate, between 1999 and 2004 France reduced the number of 
days from 53 to 8; Spain from 82 to 47 and Italy from 62 to 13. 
 
However, drawing upon the work of Baumol (1990) there is now less unanimity 
amongst researchers. Capelleras et al. (2008) compare highly regulated Spain with 
low regulation Britain. They find some evidence that fewer new firms are started 
in Spain, implying support for the thesis that regulation depresses entrepreneur-
ship. However this is only if official data for new firms are used. Instead, when 
both official and unofficial firms are included these differences disappear. Their 
view is that, compatible with Baumol and Van Stel et al. (2007), regulation serves 
to influence the  distribution  of  entrepreneurship  between  different activities  but 
hardly affects the total quantity.  
 
•  Rule of Law 
 
It seems clear that for entrepreneurship to function effectively requires property 
rights to be clearly defined and enforced. There has to be a mechanism for con-
tracts to be agreed and a legal system in place to enforce such contracts. 
 
The evidence presented by Nyström (2008) clearly points to a powerful link be-
tween legal structure, the security of property rights on the one hand and entrepre-
neurship on the other. 
 
However  the  alternative  argument  is  twofold.  The  first  is  that  whilst  of  course 
those entrepreneurs that operate their business using legal channels benefit from a 
cheap, transparent and fair legal system, many enterprising individuals will find al-
ternative but possibly  equally effective methods for contract enforcement which 
are independent of the legal system. Indeed they may view greater transparency as 
not working to their advantage. The second argument is that whilst most entrepre-
neurs do benefit from improvements in the rule of law, they may benefit less than 
large firms which are more able to exploit their market dominance. Some support 
for this is provided by Aidis et al. (2009). They find a positive effect of Rule of 
Law using a sample of both developing countries and middle-income economies. 
However, when a group of highly developed economies is included as well, the ef-
fect of Rule of Law disappears. 
 
Our view is that the theory and the evidence on linking entrepreneurship with the 
rule of law are mixed. 
 
•  Social security entitlements 
 
The final factor we include is social security entitlements. Here the logic is that the 
individual who is either unemployed or economically inactive is less likely to take 
the risk of shifting from those states and into entrepreneurship when social security 
income is high than when it is low or non-existent. It also seems clear than in-
creases in social security entitlements will lower the attraction of entrepreneurship 
and vice versa (Hessels et al., 2007).  
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3. The Model 
The prime purpose of the paper is to link entrepreneurship with institutions and 
regulation. To achieve this we first need to include four different groups of con-
trols: Demography/Human Capital; Macro-economic conditions; Attitudes and cul-
ture; and Innovation. 
 
However entrepreneurship is not a single event and we would not expect the same 
factors to influence for example, starting a business as remaining in business. We 
therefore now set out the influence of entrepreneurship as a process and then turn 
to examining the four groups of control variables. 
 
3.1 Entrepreneurship as a process 
Several studies investigate the determinants of entrepreneurship, either at the mi-
cro-level or at the macro-level (for an overview, see Van der Zwan et al., 2009b). 
Various measures of entrepreneurship are used in the literature, varying from dy-
namic measures (referring to the extent of new entrepreneurship) such as nascent 
entrepreneurship,  young  business  entrepreneurship  or  new-firm  startup  rates,  to 
static measures (referring to the extent of incumbent entrepreneurship) such as the 
share of small businesses in production or business ownership rates. Cross-country 
correlations between new and incumbent entrepreneurship rates are not necessarily 
high (Van Stel, 2006, pp. 7-8). Hence, determinants of static and dynamic meas-
ures of entrepreneurship may also be different. Nevertheless, in most studies to 
date only a single measure of entrepreneurship is used (either static or dynamic) so 
that the picture of the determinants of entrepreneurship is incomplete. 
 
At the micro level, there is a small literature which studies entrepreneurship as a 
process (Grilo and Thurik, 2008; Van der Zwan et al., 2009a, 2009b). In this litera-
ture  individual  level  data  from  the  European  Commission  (the  so-called  'Flash 
Eurobarometer Surveys on Entrepreneurship') are analysed extensively. In particu-
lar, this data source asks respondents whether they "never thought about starting a 
business", "are thinking about starting a business", "are taking steps to start a busi-
ness", "are running a business for less than three years", or "are running a business 
for more than three years" (Grilo and Thurik, 2008). These are ascending levels of 
engagement on the 'entrepreneurial ladder' (Van der Zwan et al., 2009a). Van der 
Zwan et al. (2009b) show that countries display different performance patterns re-
garding these entrepreneurial engagement levels. While some countries such as the 
United States score relatively high on "thinking about starting a business", other 
(European) countries score lower on "thinking" but higher on transitions from nas-
cent activity to actual start-ups. The authors also show that various transitions be-
tween the different levels of entrepreneurial engagement have different (country-
level) determinants. In sum, this emerging literature consistently shows that it is 
important  to  distinguish  between  various  stages  of  entrepreneurial  engagement. 
Similar to the above-mentioned studies using micro-level data, we will distinguish 
between various stages of entrepreneurial engagement using macro-level data. 
 
3.2 Institutions and regulations 
As noted earlier our four measures of Institutions and regulations are: taxes, regu-
lation, the rule of law and social security entitlements. 
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3.3 Explanatory control variables included in the present study 
We then incorporate potential determinants of entrepreneurship from four groups 
of  variables:  demography/human  capital,  macro-economic  conditions,  atti-
tudes/culture and innovation.  
 
•  Demography/human capital 
 
Examples of demography/human capital variables relevant to entrepreneurial activ-
ity are educational attainment and the age and gender composition of the popula-
tion.  It  is  argued  that  education  enhances  the  entrepreneurial  option  and  that  a 
higher  proportion  of  middle  aged  males  has  a  similar  effect.  In  particular,  the 
prevalence  rate  of  nascent  entrepreneurs  is  often  seen  to  be  highest  in  the  age 
group 25-34 years (Delmar and Davidsson, 2000; Verheul et al., 2002). We include 
four variables in this category: enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary educa-
tion, population 25-39 year old as a share of population 25-64 years old, and the 
share of women in the labour force. 
 
•  Macro-economic conditions 
 
Examples of macro-economic conditions which can influence the attractiveness of 
entrepreneurship are unemployment and per capita income. The impact of unem-
ployment on entrepreneurship is indeterminate from theory, as both recession-push 
and prosperity-pull effects are at play (Storey, 1991). Moreover, there may also be 
reversed causality as entrepreneurial activity contributes to bringing down unem-
ployment (Thurik et al., 2008). The sign of per capita income is also hard to pre-
dict. On the one hand, higher per capita income rates may increase demand for new 
products, creating more room for entrepreneurship. On the other hand, increasing 
per  capita  income  may  be  accompanied  with  increasing  exploitation  of  scale 
economies, consistent with a negative impact on entrepreneurship (Carree et al., 
2002). Finally, we also include the share of services in the economy. As entry bar-
riers are lower for services compared to, for instance, manufacturing, economies 
with a higher services share may be expected to have more entrepreneurs. 
 
•  Attitudes/culture 
 
It is often argued that individuals in different countries have a very different atti-
tude to risk and hence to entrepreneurship. Such cultural differences may be re-
lated to structural differences in entrepreneurship rates across countries (Freytag 
and Thurik, 2007; Wennekers, 2006). It is therefore possible to link entrepreneur-
ship rates to data on attitudes that are available from Hofstede (2001). Whilst it is 
not always clear that culture/attitudes are independent of those of the more eco-
nomic variables identified above, their inclusion in these equations has merit. 
 
•  Innovation 
 
It is recognised that there is, in the Schumpeterian framework, a clear link between 
innovation  and  entrepreneurship.  Again  there  are  problems  about  the  extent  to 
which innovation can be considered to be exogenous but data on R&D should be 
included  as  independent  variable  in  equations  explaining  entrepreneurship.  As 
formal R&D is often applied in large companies, the relation with entrepreneurship 
rates is expected to be negative.   11 
 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
We will estimate a SUR regression model using different measures of entrepre-
neurship (dependent variable) and using a large range of independent variables. 
We classify these variables into five groups of explanations. Below we describe 
the dependent variables and (groups of) independent variables used in our regres-
sion  models.  For  each  variable  we  identify  for  which  countries  and  years  it  is 
available. In doing so, we use the data availability in EIM's Compendia data base 
(the source for our incumbent entrepreneurship measure) as a reference point. This 




4.1 Dependent variable: entrepreneurial activity 
We use three measures of entrepreneurship reflecting the sequential stages in the 
entrepreneurial  process:  nascent  entrepreneurship,  young  business  entrepreneur-
ship and incumbent entrepreneurship. Nascent and young business entrepreneur-
ship are taken from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data base (Rey-
nolds et al., 2005) while incumbent entrepreneurship is taken from EIM's Compen-
dia data base (Van Stel, 2005).
3 
 
The nascent entrepreneurship rate defines entrepreneurship as the percentage of the 
adult population (18-64 years of age) that is actively involved in setting up a busi-
ness.  The  young  business  entrepreneurship  rate  is  defined  as  the  percentage  of 
adult  population  that  currently  owns  and  manages  a  young  business  that is  less 
than 42 months old (Reynolds et al., 2005). These measures are available for the 
period 2002-2007. Incumbent entrepreneurship is operationalised as the business 
ownership rate (BOR), as measured in EIM's Compendia data base. The business 
ownership rate is defined as the total number of unincorporated and incorporated 
self-employed (excluding agriculture) as a share of the total labor force (Van Stel, 
2005).  An  important  difference  with  the  previous  measures  is  that  the  business 
ownership rate also includes entrepreneurs of older (incumbent) businesses. This 
measure is available from 1972-2007. 
 
4.2 Independent variables 
We use independent variables from five groups of explanations. The sources and 
definitions of the variables used in the analyses are listed below. 
 
•  Demography/human capital:   
  −  Educational attainment 
  Data on educational attainment are taken from the World Bank's data base 
EdStats.
4 We use gross enrollment rates for secondary and tertiary educa-
tion. Both variables are available for 23 OECD countries covering the pe-
riod 1972-2006. Germany is missing prior to 1990.  
 
2 The 23 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, USA, Japan, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. 
3 COMParative ENtrepreneurship Data for International Analysis (available at http://www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu/). 
4 http://go.worldbank.org/ITABCOGIV1, and http://go.worldbank.org/47P3PLE940.   12 
  −  Age composition 
  We used the OECD Demographic and Labour Force Databases, the U.S. 
Census Bureau International Database and United Nations Statistics (UN-
Stats) to construct the variable age composition. This variable is defined as 
the population aged 25-39 years as a share of the population aged 25-64 
years. It is available for all 23 OECD countries in the period 1972-2006. 
  −  Female labour share (FLS) 
  The female labour force as a share of the total labour force is taken from 
OECD Labour Force Statistics covering 23 OECD countries in the period 
1972-2007. This variable is available via EIM's Compendia data base. 
 
•  Macro Economic Conditions:   
  −  Service share 
  The service share refers to the share of the service sector
5 in total employ-
ment excluding agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. These data are 
taken from OECD Labour Force Statistics.
6 The service share is available 
for 23 OECD countries in the period 1972-2006. 
  −  Unemployment rate 
  The standardised unemployment rate measures the number of unemployed 
as a percentage of the total labour force. It is taken from OECD Main Eco-
nomic Indicators, and available for 23 OECD countries in the period 1972-
2007. This variable is available via EIM's Compendia data base. 
  −  Per capita income 
  Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is expressed in (thousands of) 
purchasing  power  parities  per  US  dollar  at  1990  prices.  These  data  are 
constructed  from  underlying  series  in  OECD  National  Accounts  and 
OECD Labour Force Statistics. It is available for 23 OECD countries in 
the period 1972-2007, via EIM's Compendia data base. 
 
•  Institutions:   
  −  Social Security Entitlements (SSE) 
  Social security entitlements are operationalised as the unemployment gross 
replacement rate. Data are taken from the OECD Benefits and Wages Sta-
tistics
7. The data are available on a bi-annual basis during 1961-2003. The 
even years are interpolated and data after 2003 are extrapolated. SSE is 
available for 23 OECD countries in the period 1972-2006. 
  −  Taxes 
  Two tax variables are included in the models. First, total tax revenue as 
percentage of GDP is taken from the OECD Revenue Statistics
8 and avail-
able for 23 OECD countries in the period 1972-2006. Second, the rate of 
taxation of corporate and capital income is taken from the OECD Tax Da-
tabase.
9 It refers to basic (non-targeted) corporate income tax rates for the 
total  central  and  sub-central  governments  (combined).  This  variable  is 
available for 23 OECD countries in the period 1981-2006 (Luxembourg 
 
5 The service sector includes Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels; Transport, storage and communication, 
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services; and Community, social and personal services. 
6 www.sourceoecd.org, National Accounts (detailed tables population and employment). 
7 http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2649_34637_34053248_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
8 www.sourceoecd.org, Revenue (comparative tables). 
9 http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_37427,00.html.   13 
and  Iceland  are unavailable  prior to  2000; Japan is  unavailable  prior  to 
1990). 
  −  Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
  The strictness of employment protection legislation is taken from the CEP-
OECD  Institutions  Data  Set  (1960-2004).
10  The  original sources  are de-
scribed in a discussion paper by Nickell (2006). Higher values correspond 
to increasing strictness of employment protection. EPL is available for 20 
OECD countries (Greece, Luxembourg and Iceland are missing) in the pe-
riod 1975-2003. The series is extrapolated to 2006.  
  −  Rule of Law 
  From the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
11 we have 
taken the variable Rule of Law. The Rule of Law index measures "percep-
tions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules  of  society,  and  in  particular  the  quality  of  contract  enforcement, 
property  rights,  the  police,  and  the  courts,  as  well  as  the  likelihood  of 
crime  and  violence"  (Kaufmann  et  al.,  2009,  p.  6).  As  described  in  the 
WGI data set, the value range of this indicator is from about -2.5 to 2.5, 
where higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. It holds 
that all governance indicators included in the World Bank's WGI data base 
"reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of govern-
ance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey re-
spondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number 
of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and in-
ternational organizations." The indicator is available from 1996 onwards. 
 
•  Attitudes/Culture:   
  −  Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions 
  When accounting for a nation's culture, we draw on Geert Hofstede's Cul-
tural Dimensions.
12 Hofstede (2001) distinguishes different types of cul-
tural measures of which four are included in the models: 
￿  Power  Distance  Index  (PDI)  refers  to  "the  extent  to  which  the  less 
powerful members  of  institutions  and organizations within  a  country 
expect and accept that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede, 2001, 
p. 98). "This represents inequality (more versus less), but defined from 
below, not from above. It suggests that a society's level of inequality is 
endorsed  by  the  followers  as  much  as  by  the  leaders",  Hofstede  ex-
plains at his website.  
￿  Individualism (IDV) as opposed to collectivism. "Individualism stands 
for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: Everyone 
is expected to look after him/herself and her/his immediate family only. 
Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards 
are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout peo-
ple's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty." (Hofstede, 2001, p. 225). In other words, individualism refers 
to the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. 
￿  Masculinity (MAS) as opposed to femininity. "Masculinity stands for a 
society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: Men are sup-
 
10 http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/data0730.zip, and http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0759.pdf. 
11 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. 
12 http://www.geert-hofstede.com/.   14 
posed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women 
are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality 
of life. Feminity stands for a society in which social gender roles over-
lap: Both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and con-
cerned with the quality of life." (Hofstede, 2001, p. 297). At his web-
site Hofstede explains that the assertive pole has been called 'mascu-
line' and the modest, caring pole 'feminine'.  
￿  Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) refers to "the extent to which the 
members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situa-
tions." (Hofstede, 2001, p. 161). As explained at Hofstede's website, 
uncertainty avoidance "deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty 
and ambiguity; it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. It indi-
cates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either un-
comfortable  or  comfortable  in  unstructured  situations.  Uncertainty 
avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by 
strict laws and rules, safety and security measures, and on the philoso-
phical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. […] The oppo-
site type, uncertainty accepting cultures, are more tolerant of opinions 
different from what they are used to; they try to have as few rules as 
possible, and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist 
and allow many currents to flow side by side." 
 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions concern a one-time measurement and are 
therefore included in the model as time-invariant variables. Data is avail-
able for 22 OECD countries (not for Iceland). 
 
•  Innovation:   
  −  Research & Development (R&D) 
  R&D as percentage of GDP is computed by dividing Research and Devel-
opment  expenditures  in  national  currency  from  the  OECD  Science  and 
Technology Database
13 by Gross Domestic Product (market prices, value) 
in national currency from the OECD Economic Outlook.
14 R&D as per-
centage of GDP is available for 23 OECD countries in the period 1981-
2006 (Luxembourg is missing prior to 2000). 
 
When including all variables in the model we end up with 20 countries (with re-
spect to the 23 countries listed in Section 4, Greece, Iceland and Luxembourg are 
missing due to missing data for some variables). Furthermore, as we want to com-
pare the effects of the explanatory variables on the three different entrepreneurship 
measures, we should use the same sample for each variable. This restricts our sam-
ple to the years 2002-2006. Finally, some countries participating in GEM do not 
participate each year. In sum, we have a sample of 88 observations, relating to 20 
OECD countries over the period 2002-2006. Because for the business ownership 
rate we have data for a longer time period, we will apply a robustness test using a 
bigger sample.  
 
The correlation matrix for the 88 observation sample is presented in Table 1. As 
can be seen, correlations between nascent and young business entrepreneurship on 
the one hand, and business ownership (incumbent entrepreneurship) on the other, 
 
13 www.sourceoecd.org, Science, Technology and R&D (table E1, Gross domestic Expenditure on R&D – GERD). 
14 www.sourceoecd.org, Economic Outlook No. 82: Annual and quarterly data.   15 
are not strong (0.2) suggesting these forms of entrepreneurship are indeed differ-
ent. On the other hand, the correlation between nascent and young business entre-
preneurship is quite strong (0.8). To take account of the correlations between the 
entrepreneurship variables we will jointly estimate the effects of the explanatory 
variables  on the three dependent  variables using  seemingly  unrelated  regression 
(SUR).   16 
Table 1. Correlation matrix of all dependent and independent variables (N = 88). 


































































































































































































































1  1                                       
2  0.801  1                                     
3  0.209  0.208  1                                   
4  0.091  0.185  0.103  1                                 
5  0.270  0.318  -0.114  0.182  1                               
6  0.281  0.351  0.317  0.147  -0.276  1                             
7  0.202  0.127  -0.604  0.097  0.521  -0.430  1                           
8  0.602  0.550  0.395  0.057  -0.133  0.329  -0.154  1                         
9  -0.276  -0.447  0.167  -0.027  -0.016  -0.040  -0.151  -0.520  1                       
10  0.327  0.166  -0.294  -0.139  0.235  -0.144  0.338  0.420  -0.459  1                     
11  -0.291  -0.251  -0.142  0.246  -0.062  0.106  -0.027  -0.534  0.151  -0.331  1                   
12  -0.428  -0.374  -0.240  0.223  0.310  -0.357  0.392  -0.680  0.237  -0.171  0.591  1                 
13  -0.021  -0.178  0.110  -0.081  0.008  -0.217  -0.059  -0.024  0.387  -0.215  -0.283  -0.095  1               
14  -0.556  -0.439  -0.112  0.087  -0.122  -0.111  -0.075  -0.590  0.270  -0.587  0.365  0.367  0.021  1             
15  0.252  0.338  -0.651  0.233  0.331  -0.242  0.724  0.035  -0.447  0.325  -0.023  0.089  -0.295  -0.091  1           
16  -0.328  -0.511  0.230  -0.044  -0.380  0.060  -0.391  -0.125  0.588  -0.273  0.046  -0.037  0.467  0.226  -0.672  1         
17  0.523  0.393  0.216  0.182  0.214  0.000  0.283  0.622  -0.291  0.506  -0.187  -0.056  0.032  -0.650  0.218  -0.272  1       
18  0.169  0.078  0.404  -0.298  -0.487  0.163  -0.555  0.444  0.026  -0.028  -0.525  -0.704  0.176  -0.404  -0.399  0.228  0.008  1     
19  -0.325  -0.445  0.236  -0.084  -0.393  0.011  -0.488  -0.271  0.563  -0.487  0.109  -0.092  0.463  0.369  -0.614  0.849  -0.535  0.345  1   
20  -0.287  -0.317  -0.614  -0.094  0.302  -0.595  0.497  -0.338  -0.012  0.275  -0.231  0.213  0.111  0.055  0.401  -0.167  -0.108  -0.184  -0.184  1 
Note: Significant at 10% level; Significant at 5% level; Significant at 1% level.   17 
5. Estimation Results 
We jointly estimate the impact of our explanatory variables on nascent entrepre-
neurship, young business entrepreneurship and incumbent entrepreneurship (busi-
ness ownership) by means of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). Regarding the 
dimensions of  our  panel, the number  of  countries  (20) is much  higher  than  the 
number of years (5), so that cross-country variations are likely to be bigger than 
variations over time. Even more importantly, the nature of three groups of inde-
pendent  variables  (demography,  institutions  and  culture)  is  such  that  variations 
across  countries  are  much  more  pronounced  than  variations  over  time,  as  these 
variables typically change slowly over time. Therefore we do not include country 
dummies in our model allowing our (sometimes time-invariant) explanatory vari-
ables to explain structural differences across countries in entrepreneurship rates. 
On the other hand, we do include year dummies to account for worldwide shocks. 
Results are shown in Table 2. 
 
Since the prime interest of the paper is in the economic institutional variables we 
shall first report our findings on their impact on entrepreneurship. We then report 
our findings on the role of the control variables.  
 
 
5.1 The impact of economic institutional variables 
Four economic institution variables were identified. First, for social security enti-
tlements, we find a non-significant impact on nascent entrepreneurship, but a nega-
tive  impact  on  young  business  entrepreneurship  and  business  ownership.  These 
findings confirm our expectation that high unemployment benefits lower the incen-
tives to become an entrepreneur. This disincentive applies not only to the unem-
ployed themselves, but also to employees. Because in case of turning unemployed, 
employees are entitled to higher benefits than business owners, it lowers the will-
ingness of a risk-averse individual to start a business. 
 
Second, taxes have a consistently negative sign. While taxes in general seem to 
negatively  influence  early-stage  entrepreneurship,  business  ownership  is  influ-
enced by corporate tax rates.  
 
Third, as expected, the sign of employment protection legislation is also consis-
tently negative, consistent with earlier studies by Ardagna and Lusardi (2009) and 
Van  Stel,  Storey  and  Thurik  (2007).  However,  the  sign  is  only  significant  for 
young business entrepreneurship indicating its impact is less pervasive than im-
plied by, for example, Ardagna and Lusardi.  
 
For Rule of Law we find no significant relation with nascent and young business 
entrepreneurship,  but  a  very  strong  negative  relation  with  business  ownership 
rates. Considering that our sample relates to developed countries only, the absence 
of a relation for nascent and young business entrepreneurship is consistent with the 
findings by Aidis et al. (2009). However, concerning the relation with business 
ownership, the findings are the reverse of Nyström (2008), who finds a positive re-
lation with 'Legal structure and security of property rights'. Our view is that the 
difference is explained by the inclusion of country dummies in Nyström (2008).
15 
 
15 Estimating our model including country dummies we found a significant positive sign for our Rule of Law variable. We 
also estimated our model with and without country dummies using Nyström’s indicator. We again found the pattern of a 
positive sign including the country dummies and a negative sign excluding the country dummies.   18 
Nyström uses a longer time period (1972-2002), which makes her choice to explain 
over-time variations understandable. On the contrary, given the short time period 
of our panel (2002-2006), and the time-invariant nature of some of our regressors, 
in this paper we choose to focus on explaining cross-country variations. This is an 
important difference with the Nyström study.  
 
What then might explain the negative relation between Rule of Law and business 
ownership? Our explanation is that Rule of Law not only facilitates entry (although 
we do not find a significant impact on early-stage entrepreneurship here) but also 
firm  growth.  Perhaps  Rule  of  Law  decreases  the  risk  of  investing  so  that  firm 
growth is easier. This, in turn, may lead to more firms reaching higher firm sizes, 
in the long run leading to a higher average firm size and higher minimum efficient 
scale (MES) levels in the economy. Higher MES levels imply higher entry barriers 
so that, in the long run, entry is lower, average firm size is higher, and the number 
of incumbent entrepreneurs is lower (but on average bigger). 
 
A second possible explanation along broadly the same lines is that, in developed 
countries where legal systems are generally well established this benefits small and 
large firms. However legal systems are complex as well as sophisticated and it is 
highly plausible that it is large rather than small firms that benefit. One example is 
the system of Employment Tribunals in the UK in which employees can bring a 
case of discrimination, unfair dismissal, breach of contract, etc., against their em-
ployer or former employer. Saridakis et al. (2008) show that, even after holding 
constant a range of factors small firms are more likely to lose cases that appear in 
court than are large firms. They attribute this to the greater formality and docu-
mentation of the employment relation in large firms compared to small firms. So, 
despite  the  sophistication  of  the  legal  system  benefitting  firms  both  large  and 
small, the benefits appear to accrue disproportionately to the large.  
 
 
5.2 The "control" variables 
The table displays several interesting results. Education, as is often the case, exerts 
a complex influence on measures of entrepreneurship. We find secondary educa-
tion positively influences entrepreneurship at the more mature stage (i.e. business 
ownership) while tertiary education positively influences pre-start and early-stage 
entrepreneurship.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  higher-educated  individuals 
more often try to exploit new ideas by starting up new businesses. However, the 
non-significant  impact  of  tertiary  education  on  incumbent  entrepreneurship  may 
indicate that many of these businesses do not survive, consistent with the Schum-
peterian concept of creative destruction. Instead, business ownership is positively 
influenced by secondary education, possibly indicating that business ownership in-
cludes many mom-and-pop businesses. 
 
We find that countries with higher shares of 25-39 years old individuals and high 
female labour participation have more nascent entrepreneurs and young businesses 
but  less  incumbent  entrepreneurs.  Again,  while  many  young  people  and  many 
women may be involved in creative destruction battles for new consumer demand, 
business ownership includes many male entrepreneurs in the category 40-64 years 
old, where business survival rates are much higher (Cressy, 1996). 
 
As regards macro-economic conditions, we find, as expected, a positive relation 
between services share and business ownership. The impact of unemployment var-  19 
ies for the three forms of entrepreneurship, illustrating the complex relation be-
tween unemployment and entrepreneurship (Thurik et al., 2008). While per capita 
income does not influence the number of people preparing for entrepreneurship, it 
does –negatively– influence entrepreneurship at the more mature stages where ac-
tual businesses are involved. This may indicate that in higher developed countries, 
there are more safe wage jobs available for talented individuals (Lucas, 1978).  
 
As regards the cultural variables, they are strongly related to several forms of en-
trepreneurship. First, the sign of Hofstede's power distance index is strongly nega-
tive, suggesting that it is unusual for people in a high-PDI country to be in charge 
of their own business. People in these countries are very much used to hierarchical 
relations where employees follow orders without asking questions. In such a cul-
ture it is unusual to be in charge of your own business where people do not follow 
orders but instead have to take responsibility for the success of the business. 
 
As expected, individualism is positively associated with young business and in-
cumbent entrepreneurship. Perplexingly, Masculinity is negatively associated with 
business  ownership.  Finally,  we  find  a  consistently  positive  sign  for  the  uncer-
tainty avoidance index (UAI). Although this result seems counterintuitive at first 
sight, this finding may be explained by a lack of room for intrapreneurship in high-
UAI countries. In these countries ideas of employees in firms will more often be 
denied by their bosses as they are not willing to take risk by trying to exploit new 
ideas. The 'entrepreneurial employees' (intrapreneurs) in these firms get frustrated 
and start up their own firms in an attempt to commercialize their ideas. In low-UAI 
countries the ideas of intrapreneurs will more often be awarded by their bosses so 
that they do not need to start their own firms in order to exploit their ideas (Wen-
nekers et al., 2007). 
 
The  final  category  of  variables  is  innovation.  For  R&D  we  find  a  consistently 
negative effect, consistent with the notion that most (formal) R&D activity takes 
place in very large firms. 
 
 
5.3 Robustness test 
We are  aware that,  compared to the number  of observations in our  sample, the 
number  of  variables  in  our  model  is  relatively  high.  This  is  caused  by  the  low 
number of years available in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. However, for 
the business ownership rate we have longer times series available. Therefore, we 
have performed a robustness check, to test how results change if the sample of ob-
servations is bigger. In Table 3 in the appendix we show the results of our equation 
for business ownership when we include 11 years in the sample instead of five (our 
period is restricted to 1996-2006 because our variable Rule of Law is not available 
prior to 1996). We see that, with a few exceptions, results are quite robust.  
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Table 2. Explaining entrepreneurial activity across countries 
  Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
       
  I  II  III 






Constant  -28.122***  (-3.75)  -2.609  (-0.49)  44.796***  (6.55) 
Demography             
Enrollment in secon-
dary education 
0.0050  (0.51)  0.0051  (0.73)  0.032***  (3.61) 
Enrollment in tertiary 
education 
0.041**  (2.20)  0.040***  (3.02)  0.011  (0.67) 
Age composition  0.187**  (2.06)  0.244***  (3.82)  -0.204**  (-2.46) 
Female labour share  0.461***  (4.32)  0.051  (0.68)  -0.247**  (-2.54) 
Macro-economic 
conditions             
Service share  0.041  (1.32)  -0.019  (-0.88)  0.078***  (2.73) 
Unemployment rate  0.157  (1.41)  -0.206***  (-2.62)  0.313***  (3.07) 
Per capita income  0.066  (0.88)  -0.190***  (-3.59)  -0.390***  (-5.68) 
Institutions             
Social security  0.020  (0.77)  -0.045**  (-2.44)  -0.119***  (-4.97) 
Taxes as % GDP  -0.100**  (-2.34)  -0.070**  (-2.31)  -0.014  (-0.36) 
Corporate tax rate  0.025  (0.79)  -0.014  (-0.65)  -0.187***  (-6.47) 
Employment protec-
tion legislation  -0.325  (-0.96)  -0.722***  (-3.03)  -0.091  (-0.29) 
Rule of Law  -0.549  (-0.65)  0.923  (1.54)  -8.162***  (-10.53) 
Attitudes/Culture             
Power distance index  -0.087***  (-3.03)  -0.046**  (-2.30)  -0.184***  (-7.04) 
Individualism  0.024  (0.79)  0.040*  (1.87)  0.144***  (5.28) 
Masculinity  0.0048  (0.29)  -0.017  (-1.41)  -0.051***  (-3.33) 
Uncertainty avoid-
ance index 
0.046**  (2.04)  0.032**  (2.05)  0.116***  (5.68) 
Innovation             
R&D  -0.659**  (-2.34)  -0.473**  (-2.39)  -0.564**  (-2.20) 
             
       
Log-likelihood  -128.260  -97.426  -120.189 
R
2  0.752  0.806  0.925 
Adjusted R
2  0.674  0.744  0.901 
       
Periods included  5 (2002-2006)  5 (2002-2006)  5 (2002-2006) 
Countries included  20  20  20 
N  88  88  88 
Note: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level; t-
values are between brackets; year dummies are included but not reported. 
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6. Conclusion  
This paper has examined variations in entrepreneurship across twenty developed 
countries, using three measures of entrepreneurship which we broadly describe as 
pre-start, early-stage and established enterprises. It then links variations in these 
measures of entrepreneurship primarily to what we describe as the economic insti-
tutional framework, holding constant a range of other factors.  
 
Two groups of conclusions emerge. The first is that the factors that seem to influ-
ence pre-start, early-stage and established enterprises differ often quite sharply. It 
is our view that this points to the need for more research that distinguishes care-
fully between these measures and implies that combing pre-start and early-stage 
enterprises into a single index such as GEM's TEA index is to be discouraged. 
 
Our second key finding relates to the role of economic institutions. Here our re-
sults  broadly  confirm  earlier  work  suggesting  that  social  security  entitlements, 
taxes, and employment protection legislation are negatively associated with (dif-
ferent forms of) entrepreneurial activity in a country. It confirms the predictions of 
the economic choice model that entrepreneurship can be influenced by changing 
incentive structures underlying occupational choice decisions of individuals.  
 
However, our novel finding relates to the Rule of Law variable. We find a negative 
sign  for  this  variable  on  incumbent  entrepreneurship  suggesting  that  a  "better" 
Rule  of  Law  depresses  entrepreneurship.  We  explain  this  apparently  counter-
intuitive finding by arguing that in developed economies the benefits of the rule of 
law accrue primarily to large enterprises. To illustrate we point to the sophisticated 
legal procedure of Employment Tribunals in the UK. Here employees and former 
employees can bring cases against their employer but it is clear that, because suc-
cess heavily depends on documentation, small firms are more likely to lose these 
cases than large enterprises. 
 
Our overall conclusion therefore is that economic institutions play a powerful role 
in influencing entrepreneurship. For this reason those developing such institutions 
have to recognise that the decisions they make strongly influence the relative at-
tractiveness of business ownership and other states – some times in ways that ap-
pear counter-intuitive. 
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Appendix 
Table 3.   Explaining business ownership (BOR) for different samples 
  Method: Panel Least Squares 
     
  III  III' 
  BOR  BOR 
Constant  44.668***  (5.64)  42.316***  (8.69) 
Demography         
Enrollment in secondary education  0.032***  (3.12)  0.026***  (3.36) 
Enrollment in tertiary education  0.011  (0.58)  0.0078  (0.56) 
Age composition  -0.204**  (-2.13)  -0.113**  (-2.07) 
Female labour share  -0.247**  (-2.20)  -0.106  (-1.49) 
Macro-economic conditions         
Service share  0.078**  (2.37)  0.034  (1.58) 
Unemployment rate  0.313***  (2.66)  -0.049  (-0.76) 
Per capita income  -0.390***  (-4.92)  -0.392***  (-6.48) 
Institutions         
Social security  -0.119***  (-4.30)  -0.110***  (-5.72) 
Taxes as % GDP  -0.014  (-0.32)  -0.074**  (-2.27) 
Corporate tax rate  -0.187***  (-5.60)  -0.077***  (-3.71) 
Employment protection legislation  -0.091  (-0.25)  -0.257  (-0.93) 
Rule of Law  -8.162***  (-9.12)  -8.889***  (-12.19) 
Attitudes/Culture         
Power distance index  -0.184***  (-6.10)  -0.136***  (-6.42) 
Individualism  0.144***  (4.57)  0.127***  (6.10) 
Masculinity  -0.051***  (-2.89)  -0.049***  (-3.81) 
Uncertainty avoidance index  0.116***  (4.92)  0.092***  (5.68) 
Innovation         
R&D  -0.564*  (-1.90)  -1.013***  (-4.48) 
         
     
Log-likelihood  -120.189  -373.038 
R
2  0.925  0.855 
Adjusted R
2  0.901  0.835 
     
Periods included  5 (2002-2006)  11 (1996-2006) 
Countries included  20  20 
N  88  220 
Note: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level; t-values 
are between brackets; year dummies are included but not reported. 
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